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Abstract
Empirical evidence indicates that monetary policy is not super-neutral
in many countries. In particular, in high in￿ ation economies, in￿ ation is
negatively related to economic activity. By comparison, in￿ ation may be
positively correlated with output in low in￿ ation countries. We present
a neoclassical growth model with money in which the incidence of liquid-
ity risk is inversely related to aggregate capital formation. Interestingly,
there may be multiple monetary steady-states where the e⁄ects of mon-
etary policy vary. In poor economies, the ￿nancial system is highly dis-
torted and higher rates of money growth are associated with less capital
formation. In contrast, in advanced economies, a Tobin e⁄ect is observed.
Since in￿ ation exacerbates distortions from a coordination failure in the
low capital steady-state, individuals become much more exposed to liq-
uidity risk. Consequently, optimal monetary policy depends on the level
of development.
JEL Codes: E41, E52, E31, O42
Keywords: Economic Development, Banks, Monetary Policy
1 Introduction
There is a growing awareness that monetary policy is not super-neutral in many
countries. In particular, in high in￿ ation economies, a signi￿cant amount of
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1evidence indicates that in￿ ation is negatively related to economic activity.1 For
example, in their study of Argentina and Brazil, Bae and Ratti (2000) ￿nd that
higher rates of money growth are associated with lower levels of output. By
comparison, in￿ ation may be positively correlated with output in low in￿ ation
economies. Notably, Bullard and Keating (1995) demonstrate that in￿ ation is
positively correlated with output in some low in￿ ation countries while in others
there is no relationship. Ahmed and Rogers (2000) focus on the U.S. economy.
In their analysis, in￿ ation and output are positively correlated. It has also
been observed that in￿ ation is generally higher in developing countries than
industrialized economies.
Why do the e⁄ects of monetary policy vary across countries? In this pa-
per, we propose an interesting explanation based on the degree of liquidity risk
at di⁄erent stages of economic development. In particular, in poor countries,
individuals are more susceptible to events which cause them to liquidate their
holdings of assets. This behavior is well documented in a number of studies of
developing countries.2;3 Since the exposure to liquidity risk varies across coun-
tries, individuals respond di⁄erently to rates of return in low income countries
than in advanced economies. As a result, the e⁄ects of monetary policy will also
vary between developing and advanced countries.
We proceed by outlining the details of our modeling framework. We study an
overlapping generations economy with production similar to Diamond (1965).
Following Townsend (1987) and Schreft and Smith (1997), there are two dif-
ferent geographically separated locations. There are also two types of assets:
￿at money and physical capital. Within each location, agents have complete
information regarding others￿asset holdings. However, across locations, there is
incomplete information such that individuals do not have the ability to estab-
lish and trade claims to assets. If an individual is forced to trade outside of his
location of residence, he must acquire money balances. In this manner, private
information leads to a transactions role for money.
1A number of studies investigate the relationship between in￿ation and the growth rate of
output across countries. Barro (1995) concludes that in￿ation is negatively related to growth ￿
regardless of the in￿ation rate. In contrast, Bruno and Easterly (1998) ￿nd that high in￿ation
crises are associated with lower rates of growth.
2For example, Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993) point out that households in poor countries
are more likely to liquidate holdings of physical capital in response to adverse productiv-
ity shocks. In addition, Jacoby and Skou￿as (1997) contend that poor, agrarian households
withdraw children from school in the face of low realizations of income ￿thus, in developing
countries, families are far more likely to liquidate investments in human capital. Moreover, the
provision of social insurance (or lack of it) also plays a signi￿cant role. In particular, Chetty
and Looney (2005) calculate that expenditures on social insurance programs in developed
countries are nearly three times the amount of developing economies. As a result, individuals
in developing countries are more likely to sell holdings if adverse shocks occur. Gertler and
Gruber (2002) stress that health shocks would lead to less disruption of consumption smooth-
ing if countries had more generous social insurance programs. The same arguments apply
to labor market outcomes ￿publicly provided unemployment assistance would mitigate the
economic costs of bad shocks.
3McPeak (2006) emphasizes that it is easier for wealthy households in poor countries to
enter into risk-sharing arrangements. As a result, wealthy households do not need to liquidate
investments as often as poor households.
2Furthermore, individuals are subject to random relocation shocks. As money
is the only asset that can cross locations, relocated agents must liquidate all
their asset holdings into currency. Thus, random relocation is analogous to
liquidity preference shocks in Diamond and Dybvig (1983). As a result, the
model illustrates the risk pooling role of ￿nancial intermediaries.
In contrast to previous work, we assume that the probability of a liquid-
ity shock is inversely related to the aggregate capital stock. We view that
this relationship serves as a proxy for the linkages between economic develop-
ment and liquidity risk observed in many studies. As in a standard random
relocation model such as Schreft and Smith, an individual￿ s return from bank
deposits is stochastic. Expected income depends on the probability distribution
of an individual￿ s location status and the return in each state. However, in
the standard random relocation model, the probability of a liquidity shock is
independent of real variables. By comparison, in our framework, the probability
distribution depends on the amount of capital accumulation. Since money is
dominated in rate of return, income will be lower if an individual is forced to
liquidate assets early. Moreover, relocation is less likely if capital accumulation
is higher. From this perspective, the probability distribution of income in ad-
vanced economies ￿rst-order stochastically dominates the probability distribution
in developing countries.4
As the distribution of income in an economy with a high capital stock domi-
nates the probability distribution in an economy with a low capital stock, there
are positive spillovers from capital accumulation in our model. Moreover, the
economy-wide stock of capital in￿ uences the returns of a bank ￿if the proba-
bility of a relocation shock is low, individuals are more likely to derive earnings
from physical capital. As a result, each ￿nancial institution will devote more
resources to capital if the economy-wide stock of capital is high. In this manner,
strategic complementarities from investment in physical capital are an important
aspect of our modeling framework.5
Due to the presence of strategic complementarities, multiple monetary steady-
states can occur. In the economy with a low amount of capital accumulation, an
individual is highly likely to need to liquidate her asset holdings. Consequently,
an individual￿ s expected utility will be low. Moreover, her expected income
from investment in capital will be low. In turn, banks acquire large amounts
4This de￿nition follows Hadar and Russell (1969). Foster and Shorrocks (1988) propose
that income distributions between countries can be compared using various degrees of stochas-
tic dominance. Bishop et. al. (1991) construct data on the income distributions of 26 di⁄erent
countries. Based on their evidence, international comparisons of income distributions can of-
ten be ranked according to ￿rst-order stochastic dominance. Moreover, their results indicate
that the stochastic dominance of one income distribution over another generally depends on
each country￿ s level of economic development. That is, the income distributions of developed
economies tend to ￿rst-degree dominate the income distributions of developing countries. This
is consistent with the primary assumption of our modeling framework ￿the probability dis-
tribution of income in an economy with a high amount of capital accumulation dominates an
economy with a low stock of capital.
5As discussed in Drazen (1987) and Cooper and John (1988), strategic complementari-
ties may be observed in situations where an individual￿ s payo⁄ depends on economy-wide
aggregates.
3of money balances and devote little resources to productive activity.6 The re-
duced state of economic development exacerbates the problem of liquidity risk,
increasing the need for banks to hold money. In this manner, a coordination
failure occurs ￿the level of income is ine¢ ciently low since no individual agent
realizes any gains from deviating from equilibrium behavior.7 In addition, as in
Schreft and Smith, the low amount of capital formation leads to high nominal
interest rates ￿another sign of the degree of ine¢ ciency in the ￿nancial system.
In contrast, in the economy with a high capital stock, there is little incentive for
banks to acquire liquid assets. This allows banks to channel more resources to
investment in physical capital which further stimulates the amount of income
in the economy.
Interestingly, the model generates important insights regarding the impact
of monetary policy between developing and advanced countries. In the steady-
state with a low amount of capital accumulation, the banking system is highly
distorted and ￿nancial institutions will hold highly liquid portfolios.8 This im-
plies that the marginal bene￿t from holding money will be much lower if in￿ation
is higher.
If the probability of relocation is independent of the economy￿ s stage of
development, banks respond to in￿ ation by reallocating asset holdings so that
the costs of holding money fall. This is accomplished by reducing their holdings
of money and acquiring more physical capital. As a result, the marginal utility
of money balances is partially restored.
However, in our framework, individuals￿need to liquidate assets depends on
the level of economic development. In particular, in poor countries, the degree
of liquidity risk is highly sensitive to changes in the stock of capital. Rather than
lowering money balances in order to increase the marginal utility of an individual
who experiences a positive realization of the location shock, banks in a highly
distorted ￿nancial system increase the value of money by taking actions that
collectively increase the degree of liquidity risk ￿that is, they lower investment
in productive assets. Due to the increased level of poverty, individuals are more
likely to liquidate their deposits.9 Therefore, in a poor country, higher in￿ ation
6Kochar (2004) concludes that the portfolio choice of assets in developing countries depends
on the likelihood that a household will su⁄er from an adverse shock. In his work, households
anticipating a higher likelihood of poor health outcomes will devote less income to illiquid
assets. Since life expectancies in developed countries are longer than in poor countries, it
is reasonable to infer that individuals in developing countries are more likely to experience
adverse health shocks than in advanced economies. Therefore, portfolios of assets in developing
countries will be relatively more liquid than in advanced economies.
7Diamond (1982) develops a model with trading externalities where a coordination failure
can arise as an equilibrium outcome. In addition, Laing, Palivos, and Wang (1997) construct
a search-theoretic model of the labor market with endogenous human capital accumulation.
In their work, multiple balanced growth paths may exist due to positive feedback between
the likelihood of successful job matching and the returns to investment in human capital.
Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1989) show that pecuniary externalities and ￿xed costs may
be responsible for multiple equilibria with di⁄erent levels of industrialization.
8Haslag and Koo (1999) and Rousseau and Wachtel (2001) discuss that ￿nancial institu-
tions in high in￿ation countries hold a relatively large amount of liquid assets.
9Bencivenga and Smith (1991) demonstrate that ￿nancial intermediaries, through provision
of risk pooling among depositors, reduce socially unnecessary holdings of liquid assets. This
4rates are associated with a reverse-Tobin e⁄ect.
In contrast, ￿nancial institutions in advanced countries devote more re-
sources to productive activity. Since these countries are more developed, in-
dividuals are less susceptible to liquidity risk. Furthermore, changes in the
stock of capital will have little impact on the marginal utility of money. As
a result, the high costs of holding money become the dominant factor in the
portfolio choice of intermediaries in advanced economies. Consequently, in de-
veloped nations, banks will acquire additional amounts of physical capital at
higher in￿ ation rates. Therefore, in￿ ation will be associated with a Tobin e⁄ect
in advanced countries.
The analysis concludes by investigating the behavior of dynamical equilibria.
To begin, we derive a phase diagram to examine the global information on the
stability properties of the steady-states. The results demonstrate that strategic
complementarities lead to meaningful insights into the stability of economies
with di⁄erent levels of initial resources. Notably, economies must have su¢ -
cient resources in order to stabilize over time. For example, the low capital
steady-state is a source. Investigation of local dynamics also demonstrates that
undamped oscillations are possible ￿especially at high in￿ ation rates. That is,
in relatively poor economies, high rates of money growth can lead to endogenous
￿ uctuations that never disappear. Therefore, the e⁄ects of high in￿ ation policies
may be particularly unpredictable. By comparison, the high capital steady-state
is saddle-path stable. At su¢ ciently high amounts of initial resources and low
nominal interest rates, the economy can converge to the steady-state. Since
there is a unique path to the steady-state for advanced economies, it is also pos-
sible to determine the impact of a change in monetary policy along the transition
to the new long-run equilibrium.
Our work contributes to a growing literature that examines the interactions
between economic development, ￿nancial market activity, and monetary policy
such as Schreft and Smith (1997) and Antinol￿, Landeo, and Nikitin (2007). In
order to understand how monetary policy a⁄ects real activity, it is important
to identify systematic di⁄erences in the characteristics of low and high income
countries. For example, Schreft and Smith point out that banks allocate a large
fraction of deposits to government bonds in developing countries. Antinfoli et.
al. highlight that individuals in developing countries hold a large amount of
foreign currency. However, there is another important factor ￿as emphasized,
individuals in poor countries are more susceptible to liquidity risk.
As all three papers address di⁄erent aspects of the development process,
they also lead to di⁄erent monetary transmission mechanisms. In Schreft and
Smith, in￿ ation a⁄ects the ability of the government to intervene in private
￿nancial markets. In developing economies, higher rates of in￿ ation allow the
government to issue more bonds which crowds out capital formation. Advanced
economies are associated with government budget surpluses. As a result, the
suggests that the development of the banking system reduces an economy￿ s reliance on money.
In addition, Boyd, Levine, and Smith (2001) ￿nd that higher rates of in￿ation are associated
with a deterioration in ￿nancial sector activity. Thus, it is reasonable to infer that in￿ation
distorts risk sharing and induces individuals to hold more cash balances.
5actions of the monetary authority have an impact on the amount of lending to
the banking system. Antinol￿ et. al. demonstrate that at signi￿cantly high
in￿ ation rates, individuals will hold more foreign currency if the rate of return
to domestic currency falls. In our framework, there are only two assets available
￿￿at money and capital. In developing countries, as the exposure to liquidity
risk is high, in￿ ation has a signi￿cant impact on agents￿expected utility since
there is a high probability of a liquidity shock. In advanced countries, exposure
to liquidity risk is relatively una⁄ected by investment activity. Higher in￿ ation
rates raise the cost of holding money and induce individuals to switch to the
productive asset. This motivation is quite similar to standard Tobin-e⁄ect logic
￿yet, individuals￿need for cash is random; it also depends on the extent of
capital accumulation.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the model and
study the impact of monetary policy. Section 3 studies the design of optimal
monetary policy. Section 4 discusses the stability properties of our framework.
Finally, we o⁄er concluding remarks in Section 5. Most of the technical details
are presented in the Appendix.
2 Environment
We consider a discrete-time economy populated by an in￿nite sequence of two-
period lived overlapping generations, plus an initial old generation. In particu-
lar, the economy consists of two spatially separated locations. At the beginning
of each time period, a new generation of individuals is born on each island with
a population measure equal to one. Although the population resides in two
separate locations, there is a single consumption good available on both islands.
Individuals derive utility from consuming the economy￿ s consumption good (c)
when old. The utility function is expressed by U(c) = c
1￿￿
1￿￿ ; with ￿ 2 [0;1):
When young, agents are endowed with one unit of labor which they supply
inelastically. In contrast, agents are retired when old. As a result, the total
labor supply at each date is equal to the total population mass of young indi-
viduals. Private information serves as the primary trade friction in the economy.
Although each island is characterized by complete information, communication
across islands is not possible. Consequently, private liabilities do not circulate.
There are two types of assets in this economy: money (￿at currency) and
capital. De￿ne the per worker monetary base and capital stock by ￿ mt and kt
respectively. At the initial date 0, the generation of old agents at each location is
endowed with the aggregate money and capital stocks. Since the total population
is equal to one, these variables also represent aggregate values. Moreover, one
unit of investment by a young agent in period t becomes one unit of capital next
period. Equivalently, it units of goods invested become kt+1 units of capital in
the subsequent period.
Assuming that the price level is common across locations, we refer to Pt as
the number of units of currency per unit of goods at time t. Thus, in real terms,
the supply of money per worker is mt = ￿ mt=Pt.
6The consumption good is produced by a representative ￿rm which rents
capital and hires labor from young agents. The production function is given by
Yt = F (Kt;Lt); where Kt denotes the aggregate capital stock and Lt denotes
the amount of labor hired. Equivalently, output per worker is expressed by
yt = f (kt) and satis￿es standard Inada conditions. To simplify the algebra,
we assume that capital depreciates completely during the production process.
Due to perfect competition, factor inputs are paid their marginal products. The
rental rate and wage rates in period t are respectively:
Rt￿1 = fkt (kt) (1)
wt = w(kt) = f (kt) ￿ ktfkt (kt) (2)
Moreover, individuals in the economy are subject to relocation shocks. Each
period, a fraction of young agents must move to the other island. These agents
are called ￿movers.￿Limited communication and spatial separation make trade
di¢ cult between di⁄erent locations. As in standard random relocation models,
￿at money is the only asset that can be carried across islands. Furthermore,
currency is universally recognized and cannot be counterfeited ￿ therefore, it
is accepted in both locations.
Since money is the only asset that can cross locations, depositors who learn
they will be relocated will liquidate all their asset holdings into currency. Ran-
dom relocation thus plays the same role that liquidity preference shocks perform
in Diamond and Dybvig (1983). As banks provide insurance against the shocks,
each young depositor will put all of her income in the bank rather than holding
assets directly.
In contrast to previous work such as Schreft and Smith (1997), the probabil-
ity of a liquidity shock is inversely related to the aggregate capital stock. This
assumption re￿ ects the linkages between economic development and liquidity
risk observed across countries. In particular, in poor countries, individuals are
more susceptible to events which force them to liquidate their asset holdings.
Therefore, we posit that in any time period ￿t = ￿ (Kt), where 0 < ￿ (Kt) < 1
and ￿0 (Kt) < 0. Alternatively, one might interpret that an economy￿ s reliance
on cash balances depends on the level of economic development. For tractabil-
ity, ￿ (Kt) = ￿0
Kt, where 0 < ￿0 < Kt. At a given amount of capital formation, a
higher value of ￿0 indicates that individuals are more exposed to liquidity risk.
It also re￿ ects the magnitude of the external impact from the aggregate capital
stock to the probability of relocation since individuals take the aggregate capital
stock as given.10
In addition to depositors, there is a central bank that follows a constant
money growth rule. The aggregate nominal stock of cash in period t+1 can be
10Recent work by Bhattacharya, Haslag, and Martin (2007) considers that the probability of
relocation depends on the amount of e⁄ort exerted by agents. In particular, agents can reduce
the probability of moving by exerting costly e⁄ort. However, in their framework, individuals
internalize that their choices a⁄ect the likelihood of a liquidity shock.







Pt+1 is the gross rate of return on money balances between period t and
t + 1.
2.1 Trade
2.1.1 The bank￿ s problem
Due to perfect competition in the banking sector, banks choose portfolios to
maximize the expected utility of each depositor. Since ￿nancial intermediaries
reduce depositors￿consumption variability, each of them chooses to deposit all of
their income. The bank promises a gross real return rm
t if the young individual
will be relocated and a gross real return rn
t if not. Since the market for deposits
is perfectly competitive, ￿nancial intermediaries take the return on deposits as
given. As previously mentioned, banks take the aggregate capital stock as given.
As of period t, a bank determines the amount of real money balances to
hold, mt, and chooses how much to invest in capital, it. The bank￿ s balance
sheet constraint is expressed by:
mt + kt+1 ￿ wt ; t ￿ 0 (4)
Announced deposit returns must satisfy the following constraints. First,
since currency is the only asset that can be transported across locations, relo-
cated agents will choose to liquidate their asset holdings into currency. Depend-
ing on the bank￿ s money holdings and the in￿ ation rate, the return to movers
satis￿es:
￿ (Kt)rm




In addition, we choose to study equilibria in which money is dominated in
rate of return. Therefore, banks will not carry money balances between periods
t and t+1. The bank￿ s total payments to non-movers are therefore paid out of
its return on capital in t + 1:
(1 ￿ ￿ (Kt))rn
t wt ￿ Rtkt+1 (6)
Perfectly competitive banks choose return schedules and portfolio allocations
to maximize a typical depositor￿ s expected utility subject to the constraints
described above. Alternatively, one might view that each bank makes choices to
maximize the total level of welfare among its depositors. In either case, a bank
will choose values of rm
t ;rn
















subject to (4), (5), and (6).
In our framework, it is particularly important to understand the bank￿ s
















￿ (wt ￿ mt)) (8)
From (8), banks acquire money balances so that the marginal bene￿t of money
among movers is equal to the marginal cost incurred by non-movers who derive
income from earnings on capital. Given depositors￿utility functions, the bank￿ s





































where ￿ is the fraction of deposits allocated to money balances.
As in standard random relocation models in which the probability of reloca-
tion is independent of real variables, the demand for money balances depends
on the likelihood that individuals will need to liquidate their portfolios early.
However, our framework incorporates the idea that the degree of liquidity of
risk varies across di⁄erent stages of development. In poor countries, individu-
als are more susceptible to events that lead them to liquidate their holdings of
assets. For a variety of reasons, these problems are not as severe in advanced
economies. Consequently, in economies with a larger capital stock, banks de-
mand less money.























1 ￿ ￿ (Kt)
Rt (12)
92.2 General Equilibrium
We now combine the results of the preceding section and characterize the equi-
librium for the economy. In equilibrium labor receives its marginal product, (2),
and the labor market clears:
Lt = 1 (13)
From the bank￿ s balance sheet, (4); and its demand for cash reserves, (10), we










where kt = Kt in equilibrium. That is, in equilibrium, an individual bank￿ s
choice of capital investment is equal to the average level in the banking sector.
Moreover, the capital market clears when the supply of capital, (14); is equal
to its demand by ￿rms, (1): Finally, using the central bank￿ s money growth rule,



















Conditions (1), (3), (14), and (15) characterize the behavior of the economy at
each point in time.
2.3 Steady-State Analysis
De￿ne the nominal return to capital by It =
Pt+1
Pt
Rt. Imposing steady-state on
(1), (3), (14), and (15), the following two loci characterize the behavior of the




= 1 ￿ ￿ (k;I) (16)
I = ￿fk (k) (17)
where ￿(k) is the fraction of deposits allocated towards capital investment.
Moreover, ￿0 (k) > 0, ￿
00
(k) < 0, and ￿(0) = 0. In addition, the fraction of









Equation (16) represents the relationship between the supply of capital by
banks and the nominal interest rate. In addition, (17) re￿ ects the pro￿t-
maximizing amount of capital by ￿rms. The demand for capital, from (17),
10is negatively associated with I as shown in Figure 1 below. Lemma 1 describes
the behavior from (16):
Lemma 1. The locus de￿ned by (16) behaves as follows:
(a) lim
k!￿0
I(k) ! 1 and lim
k!￿￿1(1)
I(k) ! 1
(b) De￿ne ^ k such that ￿
@￿(k;I)




: If k ￿ (>)^ k; @I
@k ￿ (>)0:
The ￿rst result from part (a) of Lemma 1 indicates that the probability of a
liquidity shock will be bounded below 1. At very low levels of capital formation,
k ! ￿0, the probability of relocation is very high. Consequently, banks would
want to acquire large amounts of money. In turn, the nominal return to equity
must be very high so that banks hold both types of assets. Therefore, the
nominal interest rate will adjust so that the probability of a liquidity shock is
bounded. The second result from part (a) of Lemma 1 shows that investment
in capital cannot exceed bank deposits. That is, in advanced economies, the
return to capital (which may be viewed as the cost of holding money) must be
extremely high in order for banks to devote nearly all of their deposits to capital
holdings.
The remainder of Lemma 1 demonstrates that the relationship between eq-
uity returns and the supply of capital is di⁄erent than standard monetary growth
models. For low levels of capital, equity returns and capital accumulation are
negatively related. By comparison, in economies with more capital, equity re-
turns are associated with higher investment activity.
In order to better understand the determinants of the supply of capital, it is
useful to review the incentives of ￿nancial institutions across di⁄erent levels of
capital accumulation. For example, it is possible that two di⁄erent economies
(capital stocks) can be associated with the same rate of return.
In contrast to the standard random relocation model, the probability dis-
tribution of deposit returns depends on the amount of capital accumulation.
Notably, as the return to capital is higher than the return to money balances,
the probability distribution of income in advanced economies ￿rst-order sto-
chastically dominates the income distribution in developing countries. In this
manner, there are positive spillovers from capital accumulation in our frame-
work.
In an advanced economy where the probability of a liquidity shock is low,
individuals are more likely to derive earnings from capital. In turn, each ￿nancial
institution will seek to devote more funds to investment in physical capital.
Alternatively, at lower amounts of capital formation, an individual￿ s expected
utility will be low since it is unlikely that she will be able to gain income from
capital. As a result, in economies with little resources, banks allocate less funds
to productive activity. That is, they will hold a large amount of liquid assets
and acquire less capital to rent to ￿rms. Since an economy-wide aggregate,
the stock of capital, a⁄ects the choices of each ￿nancial institution, strategic
complementarities from investment in physical capital occur.
11Consequently, a given return to capital can be associated with two di⁄erent
levels of the supply of capital by banks. In poor economies, individuals are more
susceptible to liquidity shocks. In order for banks to be willing to hold both
money and capital, the return to capital must be high. In advanced economies,
liquidity risk is less signi￿cant ￿a high return to capital is associated with a
large cost of holding money. In turn, ￿nancial institutions choose to invest a
relatively large amount of funds in physical capital.
Furthermore, the economy￿ s level of development plays a strong role in de-
termining the relationship between equity returns and investment in physical
capital. To begin, we discuss the impact of equity returns on the portfolio
choice of ￿nancial intermediaries in developing countries (economies in which
k <^ k). If the return to capital increases, the cost of holding money (from the
foregone earnings on capital in the good state) is higher.
If banks were unable to in￿ uence the probability of individuals to experience
each state, as in a model where the probability of relocation is independent of
real variables, then they would not be able to a⁄ect depositors￿need for cash
balances relative to capital. Accordingly, intermediaries would restore the mar-
ginal bene￿t and cost from holding money by adjusting portfolios to provide
more income to individuals who experience the good state. By lowering the
amount of money balances, non-movers would obtain higher earnings from cap-
ital. As a result, the marginal bene￿t of holding money (for movers) would also
be higher.
However, the incentives of the bank are much di⁄erent when aggregate port-
folio choices a⁄ect the need for cash (the probability of the bad state). This is
particularly important in developing countries. In our framework, at low levels
of capital formation, the probability of the bad state (￿0
k ) is highly sensitive to
changes in capital accumulation. If investment in capital changes, the proba-
bility distribution of income will be signi￿cantly a⁄ected. Accordingly, if the
return to capital is higher, ￿nancial institutions do not need to provide more
income to individuals who enter the good state. Instead, banks can re-optimize
and increase the value of money by accumulating less capital so that more in-
dividuals will need to liquidate their deposits. That is, they can increase the
value of money by taking actions that collectively increase the degree of liquidity
risk.
As mentioned, if the capital stock is initially low, this is easy to accomplish
since the probability of the bad shock is highly sensitive to the amount of capital
accumulation. To be speci￿c, it is relatively easy to increase the value of money
balances if k <^ k: Therefore, the capital supply curve is downward-sloping as
long as ￿
@￿(k;I)
@k > ￿0 (k):
In contrast, in advanced economies, individuals are less susceptible to liquid-
ity risk. Moreover, changes in the stock of capital will have little impact on the
value of money; ￿
@￿(k;I)
@k is relatively low if k >^ k. This indicates that portfolio
decisions by ￿nancial institutions in advanced countries will be dominated by
the costs of holding money at higher rates of return to capital. In turn, the
supply curve of capital is upward-sloping in economies with large amounts of
12resources.
We proceed by studying existence of steady-state equilibria with positive
nominal interest rates. As listed in Proposition 1 below, there may be multiple
monetary steady-state equilibria in which I > 1:
Proposition 1. Existence of Monetary Steady-States. Suppose that













: If this condition
holds, multiple monetary steady-states may exist. Consider the following:




2: Under these conditions,
there are two monetary steady-states that exist.
(b) Suppose that ￿0 < ￿: De￿ne ￿1 and ￿2 so that ￿1 = 1
fk(k) and ￿2 =
1
fk(k), with ￿1 < ￿2: If ￿ > ￿2, there are two monetary steady-states that exist.
However, if ￿ 2 (￿1;￿2], a unique steady-state occurs.
The ￿rst condition in Proposition 1, ￿ > ￿0, re￿ ects behavior between ￿-
nancial institutions and ￿rms which rent the services of capital. In particular,
it guarantees that the demand curve for capital will always lie above the capital
supply curve at the in￿ ection point of the supply curve. Suppose that the nomi-
nal interest rate associated with the in￿ ection point is listed as b I: Alternatively,
it could be stated that b I represents the lowest nominal interest rate that satis￿es
a bank￿ s balance sheet condition. For example, consider an economy in which
banks choose to acquire ^ k units of physical capital. If the nominal return to
capital is higher than b I, the demand for money would not be high enough to
exhaust available deposits. Yet, at k = ^ k and ￿ > ￿0, the marginal revenue of
capital is relatively high ￿consequently, at b I, there would be an excess demand
for capital. As a result, there are two combinations of nominal interest rates
and capital formation where the two curves intersect. Otherwise, a steady-state
will not exist.
Case (a) demonstrates that multiple steady-states will occur if there is sig-
ni￿cant exposure to liquidity risk. Please refer to Figure 1 below for an example
￿in this situation, there is a fairly high degree of risk regardless of the amount
13of capital accumulation.
Figure 1: Risk and Multiple Steady-States
As a result, the lowest nominal interest rate associated with banks￿demand for
money balances can also be relatively high. Consequently, at moderate rates
of money growth and a relatively signi￿cant need to liquidate assets, multiple
steady-states with positive nominal interest rates can exist.
By comparison, case (b) considers economies in which individuals are not as
likely to experience liquidity shocks. Nevertheless, if the in￿ ation rate is su¢ -
ciently high, multiple nontrivial steady-states may still exist. This possibility is
illustrated in Figure 2.
14Figure 2: In￿ ation and Multiple Steady-States
However, if there is only a moderate degree of liquidity risk and in￿ ation
is not that high, a valid monetary steady-state for the high capital economy
(represented by point B) will not occur. Since the money growth rate is not
high enough, the rate of return to capital in economy B will not be high enough
to dominate the return to money.
Why are multiple steady-state equilibria possible in our framework? The
externality from the aggregate capital stock is a source of ine¢ ciency in the
economy. Moreover, from the discussion of Lemma 1, strategic complementari-
ties from investment in physical capital take place in our model. As a result, in
the economy represented by point A in Figure 1, a coordination failure is a dis-
tinct possibility ￿the level of income is ine¢ ciently low since no individual bank
realizes any gains from increasing investment in physical capital. The economy
has a low level of development where depositors are highly likely to need to
liquidate their asset holdings. This lowers expected utility and the returns to
capital. The reduced state of economic development exacerbates the problem
of liquidity risk, increasing the need for banks to hold money. By comparison,
in the economy with a high capital stock, there is little incentive for banks to
acquire liquid assets. This allows banks to channel more resources to invest-
ment in physical capital which further stimulates the amount of income in the
economy. Case (a) demonstrates that multiple steady-state equilibria will occur
as long as the externality from the aggregate capital stock is su¢ ciently strong.
Alternatively, there will be multiple steady-states if there is signi￿cant exposure
to liquidity risk, regardless of the economy￿ s level of development ￿even in the
high capital economy (represented by point B), the demand for money will be
fairly high. Consequently, there is a positive return to equity and money will
be dominated in rate of return.
15Case (a) may be considered as a statement on conditions regarding the sup-
ply of capital. If ￿0 is high enough, multiple steady-states with positive nominal
interest rates will exist because the supply of capital is su¢ ciently low. In com-
parison, case (b) demonstrates that multiple steady-state equilibria will exist
if the in￿ ation rate is signi￿cantly high. This case could be considered to be
a statement on conditions regarding the demand for capital ￿if the demand
for capital goods is su¢ ciently high, there will be multiple steady-states with
a positive return to equity. Nevertheless, as is clear from Lemma 1, the ratio-
nale for multiple steady-states relies on the idea that the degree of liquidity risk
depends on a country￿ s stage of development. As a result, the e⁄ect of equity
returns depends on the extent of capital formation.
The E⁄ects of Monetary Policy
Our framework provides a useful interpretation for the asymmetric e⁄ects
of monetary policy between developing and advanced countries. If there are
multiple valid steady-state equilibria, the e⁄ects of monetary policy will vary
across the equilibrium level of capital accumulation. If the rate of money growth
increases, the demand for capital by ￿rms shifts up as illustrated in Figure 3:
Figure 3: E⁄ects of Monetary Policy
As shown in the ￿gure, the e⁄ects of monetary policy depend on the level of
economic development. In poor countries, higher rates of in￿ ation adversely
a⁄ect capital accumulation. However, in advanced countries, the model predicts
that a Tobin e⁄ect will be observed.
In order to gain insight into the e⁄ects of monetary policy, it is useful to
review a bank￿ s condition for its portfolio choice. To begin, consider the low
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At a higher in￿ ation rate, the marginal bene￿t from holding money will be lower.
Since the economy is relatively poor, portfolios are highly liquid and sensitive
to changes in capital accumulation. Rather than reducing holdings of money to
increase the marginal utility of an individual in the bad state, banks collectively
choose allocations to increase the value of money. Banks in a highly distorted
￿nancial system increase the value of money by taking actions that increase the
probability of a liquidity shock.
In advanced economies, ￿nancial institutions devote more resources to pro-
ductive activity. Since the economy is more developed, individuals are less sus-
ceptible to liquidity risk. Changes in the stock of capital will have little impact
on the value of money. Therefore, the high costs of holding money represent
the dominant factor in the portfolio choice of ￿nancial institutions in developed
countries. This leads to a Tobin-e⁄ect.
In addition to the asymmetric e⁄ects of monetary policy on capital accumu-
lation across countries, our model suggests that the welfare costs of in￿ ation are
also likely to depend on the level of development. In poor countries, in￿ ation
will be associated with a signi￿cant increase in the degree of exposure to liquid-
ity risk. In advanced countries, there is little impact. This indicates that the
design of monetary policy should vary across countries. We turn to this issue
in the following Section.
3 Monetary Policy and Welfare
We now turn to examine the e⁄ects of monetary policy on welfare at di⁄er-
ent steady-states. As a benchmark, we follow Antinol￿ and Keister (2006) by
studying a world with complete information. In a centralized environment,
communication between locations is possible. Therefore, money will not be
held in equilibrium and the optimal level of capital formation is the golden rule:
fk (k) = 1. As all income is invested in capital, the consumption of each indi-
vidual is equal to RGRw(kGR), where the subscript GR refers to the allocation
under the golden rule. Since each agent consumes the same amount regardless




While the ￿rst best allocation may not be attained in a decentralized world
with private information and limited communication, it serves as a benchmark
to examine the degree of distortions across steady-states. In addition, we are
able to compare the allocation under the optimal monetary policy to the ￿rst
best allocation. From (7), (2), (4) - (6), (16) and (17), the expected utility of a
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While these comparisons are non-trivial to prove analytically, numerical cal-
culations provide important insights. We assume that the production function
is given by f (k) = ￿k￿, where ￿ is a technology parameter and ￿ is the capital
share of total output. The baseline set of parameters is: ￿0 = 1:2, ￿ = 0:5,
￿ = 0:5, and ￿ = 5:36.11 The results are illustrated in the following ￿gures.
Exact numerical values are provided in tables in the Appendix. Under these
parameters, we ￿rst note that a valid monetary steady-state will not exist if
￿ < 0:8. This takes place because the demand for capital is not su¢ cient to
exhaust the supply of capital (i.e., the curves from (16) and (17) curves do not
intersect).
The relationship between in￿ ation and capital formation at each steady-state
con￿rms our work from section 2 above. Moreover, for a given rate of money
growth, the market choice of investment is sub-optimal. Figure 4 illustrates the
impact of in￿ ation on capital formation along with a comparison to the golden
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Figure 4: The E⁄ects of In￿ ation on Capital Formation
11The parameter space under which our results in this section hold is signi￿cantly large.
18The locus kA shows the relationship between in￿ ation and capital accumulation
for low capital steady-states while kB re￿ ects behavior in the high capital steady-
state. Since the level of investment activity a⁄ects the degree of liquidity risk,
it results in a positive externality that leads to under-investment in capital.
However, the degree of ine¢ ciency is much higher at low levels of development.
In￿ ation exacerbates distortions associated with the coordination failure in the
low capital steady-state, leaving individuals much more exposed to liquidity risk.
This occurs because the probability of relocation is highly sensitive to changes
in capital accumulation at low levels of capital formation. Please refer to Figure
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Figure 5: The Impact of In￿ ation on the Degree of Liquidity Risk





































Figure 6: The Impact of In￿ ation on Welfare
As observed in the Figure, the welfare loss from higher rates of money growth is
particularly signi￿cant in the low capital economy. In turn, optimal monetary
policy depends on the level of economic development. Under the baseline set of
parameters, the pair (k;￿) that maximizes (19) for the high capital economy is
(3:6;0:857): By comparison, the level of welfare for the low capital economy is
maximized at (2:3;0:8). This is associated with the lowest money growth rate
in which multiple steady-states exist.
4 Dynamical Equilibria
In section 2, we demonstrate that two steady-states may exist. In this section,
we study dynamical equilibria. We ￿rst derive a phase diagram to examine the
global information on the stability properties of the steady-states. Subsequently,
we study the local stability properties of the system in the neighborhood of the
steady-state equilibria.
4.1 A Phase Diagram
In constructing the phase diagram, it is important to simplify the structure
of the economy somewhat to make the analysis more tractable. To begin, we
consider a production function of the Cobb-Douglas form: yt = f(kt) = ￿k￿
t .
In addition, we assume that ￿ = 1
2.
The nominal return to capital between period t and t + 1 is given by It =
￿f0 (kt+1): From (1), Rt = f0 (kt+1): By (14), the law of motion of capital is:
20￿kt = kt+1 ￿ kt = [1 ￿ ￿ (kt;It)]w(kt) ￿ kt (20)
Using the de￿nition of ￿ (It;kt), (10), and the evolution equation for cash re-
serves, (15), the law of motion of It can be written as:













kt+1 (kt;It) ￿ ￿0
￿ It
(21)
In the Appendix we show that the ￿kt = 0 locus is convex as illustrated in
Figure 7 below. Further, the capital stock is rising over time if [1 ￿ ￿ (kt;It)]￿
￿ (kt) > 0, where ￿ (kt) = kt
w(kt). This condition holds for all points above the
￿kt = 0 locus since
@￿(kt;It)
@It < 0.










































are two points on (22). In addition, taking the

























dk has an ambiguous sign. However, in the Appendix, we prove the
following lemma:
Lemma 2. The denominator in (23) is negative for all I ￿ 1 and k > ￿0:
In addition, dI














Lemma 2 implies that the sign of the slope from (22) depends on the sign of
the term in the numerator of (23). In particular, for all k ￿ (<)~ k, the slope is
negative (positive). In addition, ~ k is not signi￿cantly larger than ￿0. Therefore,
the ￿It = 0 locus is as illustrated in Figure 7:
21Figure 7: A Phase Diagram
Interestingly, the dynamics for the nominal interest rate depend on the size
of the capital stock. In particular, above the ￿It = 0 locus, It+1 < It if kt < ~ k:
However, It+1 > It if kt > ~ k: In this manner, the law of motion of It is as
illustrated in the Figure.
The phase diagram in Figure 7 indicates that the low capital steady-state is
a source. For example, the behavior of the nominal interest rate changes around
~ k which re￿ ects that there are initial conditions which lead to non-monotonic
behavior away from the low capital steady-state. In contrast, there is a unique
trajectory that leads to the steady-state with high economic activity. This
suggests that economies must have su¢ cient initial resources in order to be able
to stabilize over time.
The stability properties of the steady-states are consistent with previous
models with strategic complementaries such as Diamond (1982). In contrast,
in Schreft and Smith (1997), the low capital steady-state is a saddle while the
high capital steady-state is a sink. In our framework, since there is a unique
path to the steady-state for advanced economies, it is possible to determine the
impact of a change in monetary policy along the transition to the new long-run
equilibrium.12
12Under higher rates of money growth, the ￿It = 0 locus shifts upward. The high-capital
steady-state converges to a steady-state with higher levels of capital formation.
224.2 Local Dynamics
We proceed by studying the local stability properties of the system in the neigh-
borhood of the steady-states. As in the previous sub-section, the dynamic be-
havior of the economy is summarized by (20) and (21). The stability properties













We denote the determinant and trace of J by D and T respectively. The dis-
criminant, ￿, is ￿ = T2 ￿ 4D. The elements of the Jacobian are given by:
@kt+1
@kt
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> 0
Furthermore, the eigenvalues of J may be obtained by solving the following
equation:
p(￿) = jJ ￿ ￿Ij = 0

















The possibility that in￿ ation adds more uncertainty to the economy is illus-
trated in the following example:
Example. Let ￿ = 0:3, ￿ = 0:5, ￿ = 5:4, and ￿ = 1:2: At a constant rate of
money growth, the low capital steady-state amount of capital is k = 2:370 and
the nominal interest rate is I = 1:013: T = 4:358 and D = 3:397: The eigenvalues
of the Jacobian lie outside the unit circle and the steady-state is a source. If
￿ = 1:05, the steady-state is also a source. However, if the rate of money growth
is su¢ ciently high (￿ = 1:34), T2 > 4D which implies that the eigenvalues are
complex conjugates. Moreover, since the determinant of the Jacobian exceeds
unity, the steady-state displays undamped oscillatory behavior.
The example shows that in relatively poor economies, high rates of money
growth can lead to endogenous ￿ uctuations that never disappear. Therefore, the
23e⁄ects of high in￿ ation policies may be particularly unpredictable in developing
countries. Furthermore, while previous work emphasizes the role of strategic
complementarities in generating multiple steady-states, our work also indicates
that it is also a source of multiple dynamical equilibria.
5 Conclusions
There is a growing awareness that monetary policy is not super-neutral in many
countries. In particular, in high in￿ ation economies, a signi￿cant amount of
evidence indicates that in￿ ation is negatively related to economic activity. By
comparison, in￿ ation may be positively correlated with output in low in￿ ation
economies. This paper seeks to provide an explanation for the asymmetric e⁄ects
of monetary policy across countries. In particular, our analysis is based on the
idea that the degree of liquidity risk varies across di⁄erent stages of economic
development. Notably, in poor countries, individuals are more susceptible to
events which cause them to liquidate their holdings of assets. Since the exposure
to liquidity risk varies across countries, individuals respond di⁄erently to rates
of return in low income countries than in advanced economies. As a result,
the e⁄ects of monetary policy will also vary between developing and advanced
countries.
We present a neoclassical growth model with money in which the incidence
of liquidity risk is inversely related to aggregate capital formation. As the dis-
tribution of income in an economy with a high capital stock dominates the
probability distribution in an economy with a low capital stock, there are posi-
tive spillovers from capital accumulation. Moreover, strategic complementarities
from investment in capital are an important aspect of our modeling framework.
In turn, there may be multiple monetary steady-states where the e⁄ects of mon-
etary policy vary. In poor economies, the ￿nancial system is highly distorted
and higher rates of money growth are associated with less capital formation. In
contrast, in advanced economies, a Tobin e⁄ect is observed. Since in￿ ation ex-
acerbates distortions from a coordination failure in the low capital steady-state,
individuals become much more exposed to liquidity risk. Consequently, optimal
monetary policy depends on the level of development. The analysis concludes
by investigating the behavior of dynamical equilibria. The results demonstrate
that strategic complementarities lead to meaningful insights into the stability
of economies with di⁄erent levels of initial resources. Notably, the high capital
steady-state is saddle-path stable. Therefore, the impact of a change in mone-
tary policy along the transition can be determined since there is a unique path
to the steady-state for advanced economies. This suggests that the e⁄ects of
monetary policy should be easier to forecast in advanced countries.
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In the text, it has been shown
@￿(k;I)
@I < 0 and
@￿(k;I)
@k < 0. Therefore, the
sign of dI
dk depends on the sign of the term in the numerator. In particular,
dI
dk < 0 if ￿
@￿(k;I)
@k > ￿0 (k). This holds at low k since ￿00 (k) < 0. In contrast,
dI
dk > 0 if ￿
@￿(k;I)
@k < ￿0 (k), which holds at relatively high levels of capital.
Finally, dI
dkjk=^ k = 0 when ￿
@￿(k;I)




. Consequently, the supply
curve has a convex shape as illustrated in Figures 1, 2, and 3. Alternatively,
from the expression for ￿ (k;I),
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This completes the proof of Lemma 1.
2. Proof of Proposition 1. Lemma 1 describes the behavior from (16):
Further, the demand for capital is strictly decreasing in I. A necessary con-
dition for an equilibrium to exist is that the loci from (16) and (17) inter-









, where the superscripts 16 and 17 denote equations (16)



























As we are interested in cases where money is dominated in rate of return,
I > 1, the location of the I = 1 line determines the existence of steady-state
equilibria. Speci￿cally, if the I = 1 line is below the supply curve, there














< 1. Alternatively it can be expressed as a condition
on ￿0 as provided in case (a) of Proposition 1.




> 1. In this case, the I = 1 line
intersects the capital supply curve twice at k and ￿ k, where k < ￿ k are the roots





. Obviously, there exists a ￿, ￿1, such
that the intersection of (16) and (17) takes place at (k;1), where ￿1 satis￿es,
￿1 = 1
fk(k). Similarly, there exists a ￿, ￿2, such that the intersection of (16) and
27(17) takes place at
￿￿ k;1
￿
, where ￿2 satis￿es, ￿2 = 1
fk(￿ k) and ￿2 > ￿1. Clearly,
for all ￿ > ￿2, the return to capital exceeds the return to money at B and two
steady-states exist. In contrast, if ￿ 2 (￿1;￿2], there is a unique steady-state.
This completes the proof of Proposition 1.
3. List of Numerical Results for Section 3.
σ 0.800 0.850 0.900 0.950 1.000 1.050 1.100 1.150 1.200 1.250 1.300 1.350 1.400 1.450 1.500 1.550 1.600
k 3.168 3.556 3.826 4.042 4.225 4.383 4.523 4.648 4.761 4.863 4.956 5.042 5.121 5.195 5.263 5.326 5.385
m 1.603 1.499 1.417 1.347 1.285 1.229 1.178 1.131 1.088 1.048 1.012 0.977 0.945 0.915 0.887 0.860 0.835
w 4.771 5.055 5.243 5.389 5.510 5.612 5.701 5.779 5.849 5.911 5.968 6.019 6.066 6.110 6.150 6.186 6.221
Ω(k) 0.664 0.703 0.730 0.750 0.767 0.781 0.793 0.804 0.814 0.823 0.831 0.838 0.844 0.850 0.856 0.861 0.866
γ 0.336 0.297 0.270 0.250 0.233 0.219 0.207 0.196 0.186 0.177 0.169 0.162 0.156 0.150 0.144 0.139 0.134
R 1.506 1.422 1.371 1.333 1.304 1.280 1.260 1.243 1.229 1.216 1.204 1.194 1.185 1.176 1.169 1.162 1.155
I 1.205 1.208 1.233 1.267 1.304 1.344 1.387 1.430 1.474 1.520 1.565 1.612 1.658 1.705 1.753 1.800 1.848
P t/P t+1 1.250 1.176 1.111 1.053 1.000 0.952 0.909 0.870 0.833 0.800 0.769 0.741 0.714 0.690 0.667 0.645 0.625
π/k 0.379 0.337 0.314 0.297 0.284 0.274 0.265 0.258 0.252 0.247 0.242 0.238 0.234 0.231 0.228 0.225 0.223
Welfare 5.186 5.203 5.200 5.191 5.181 5.170 5.159 5.149 5.139 5.130 5.122 5.113 5.106 5.099 5.092 5.086 5.080
Table 1: High Capital Steady-State
σ 0.800 0.850 0.900 0.950 1.000 1.050 1.100 1.150 1.200 1.250 1.300 1.350 1.400 1.450 1.500 1.550 1.600
k 2.328 2.094 1.963 1.872 1.804 1.749 1.704 1.667 1.635 1.607 1.583 1.562 1.543 1.526 1.511 1.497 1.484
m 1.762 1.785 1.793 1.796 1.796 1.796 1.795 1.794 1.793 1.791 1.790 1.788 1.787 1.785 1.784 1.783 1.782
w 4.090 3.879 3.756 3.668 3.600 3.545 3.500 3.461 3.428 3.399 3.373 3.350 3.330 3.311 3.295 3.279 3.265
Ω(k) 0.569 0.540 0.523 0.510 0.501 0.493 0.487 0.482 0.477 0.473 0.469 0.466 0.463 0.461 0.458 0.456 0.454
γ 0.431 0.460 0.477 0.490 0.499 0.507 0.513 0.518 0.523 0.527 0.531 0.534 0.537 0.539 0.542 0.544 0.546
R 1.757 1.852 1.913 1.959 1.996 2.027 2.053 2.076 2.096 2.114 2.130 2.145 2.158 2.170 2.181 2.191 2.201
I 1.406 1.575 1.722 1.861 1.996 2.128 2.259 2.388 2.516 2.643 2.769 2.896 3.021 3.147 3.272 3.396 3.521
Pt/P t+1 1.250 1.176 1.111 1.053 1.000 0.952 0.909 0.870 0.833 0.800 0.769 0.741 0.714 0.690 0.667 0.645 0.625
π/k 0.515 0.573 0.611 0.641 0.665 0.686 0.704 0.720 0.734 0.747 0.758 0.768 0.778 0.786 0.794 0.802 0.809
Welfare 4.947 4.768 4.624 4.497 4.382 4.277 4.179 4.089 4.004 3.925 3.850 3.780 3.713 3.650 3.590 3.533 3.479
Table 2: Low Capital Steady-State
4. Determining the Relationship Between I and k in the ￿kt = 0
locus. The proof follows directly from the proof of Lemma 1. Under a Cobb-
Douglas production function of the form de￿ned in the text, dI






= [1 ￿ ￿ (k)], where ￿ (k) = k
w(k). It is obvious that the term
on the left-hand side is strictly increasing in k, while the term on the right-hand
side is strictly decreasing in k. Therefore, the polynomial above has a unique
positive real root, ^ k > ￿0. In addition, for all kt ￿ (<)^ k, dI
dk ￿ (<)0. The
￿kt = 0 locus has the shape illustrated in the text.
5. Determining the Relationship Between I and k in the ￿It = 0
locus. . First, it can be easily shown that dI
dk > 0 at (￿0;1) and dI









. Next, de￿ne the term in the denominator and numerator











< 0. In addition, it is clear that ￿(k;I) < 0 when
￿(k;I) > 0. Further, at any I > 1, using the de￿nition of ￿ and some algebra,



















Denote the term on the left-hand side of (25) by LHS. For all It > 1, the
@LHS
@k > 0 and @
2LHS
@k2 < 0. Moreover, lim
k!0
LHS ! ￿1 and lim
k!1
LHS ! 1.
In addition, LHS < 0 at k = ￿0. Further, we examine the term on the right-
hand side of (25), denoted RHSd. It can be shown that @RHSd
@k > 0 for all
k > ￿0. Moreover, lim
k!1
RHSd ! 0 and lim
kt!￿0







, RHS < 0. In this manner, for all k ￿ ￿0 and I ￿ 1, the
denominator is negative as LHS > RHSd for all k ￿ ￿0.









particular, for all I > 1, there exists a k, ~ k > ￿0 at which dI
dk = 0 and ~ k is
increasing in ￿. If ￿(k;I) = 0, dI















[1 ￿ ￿ (I;k)]
I
(26)
where the term on the left-hand side of (26) is identical to LHS de￿ned above in
the denominator. Characterizing the term on the right-hand side of the numer-
ator, denoted RHSn, where RHSn = ￿
[1￿￿(I;k)]
I . Unambiguously, @RHSd
@k > 0,
RHSn (￿;1) = 0, and lim
k!1
RHSn ! ￿1
I. As a result, we have one in￿ ection








, above which the numerator is positive and the
slope of (22) is negative. However, since I > 1 and ￿ is generally less than 1
2 in
the growth-accounting literature, ￿1
I is relatively small and the level of capital
at which the in￿ ection point occurs is pretty close to ￿0. Finally, it is clear that
under higher ￿, ~ k increases. The implies that the ￿It locus resembles the one
depicted in Figure 7 in the text. The dynamics for the nominal interest rate in
Figure 7 can be determined in a similar manner.
29